Do people discriminate between men and women when they are in charge of punishing defectors or rewarding cooperators? Answering this question has potentially far-reaching implications on gender equity, since cooperative behaviour forms the basis of our societies and is typically enforced through punishment or rewarding. In this paper we report on two pre-registered experiments, that we hope shed some light on this question. Study 1 (N=1,077) shows that people do not discriminate between genders when they are in charge of punishing (rewarding) defectors (cooperators) in a one-shot public goods game. In this study, punishment/reward is implemented by asking participants whether they want to pay a cost to decrease/increase the payoff of a defector/cooperator. Study 2 (N=253) extends Study 1 to a different method of punishing/rewarding; participants are asked to rate the behaviour of a defector/cooperator from 1 to 5 stars. In this case too, we find that people do not discriminate between genders. All these results are robust to splitting the sample by gender: in our context, neither men nor women discriminate between genders when they are in charge of punishing defectors or rewarding cooperators.
Introduction
Do people discriminate between men and women when they are in charge of punishing defectors or rewarding cooperators? Answering this question has potentially far-reaching implications on gender equity, since cooperative behaviour forms the basis of our societies and is typically enforced through punishment or rewarding (Andreoni, Harbaugh, & Vesterlund, 2003; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gürerk, Irlenbusch, & Rockenbach, 2006; Hilbe & Sigmund, 2010; Milinski, Semmann, Krambeck, & Marotzke, 2006; Nowak, 2006; Perc et al. 2017) .
Previous work has mainly focused on whether men and women punish differently, rather than on whether they are punished differently. A handful of studies explored gender differences in rejection rates in the ultimatum game. In this game, the proposer makes an offer to the responder about how to split a sum of money. The responder can either accept the offer (in which case the money is split as agreed) or reject the offer (in which case neither the proposer nor the responder get any money). Therefore, rejecting a low offer can be interpreted as a form of punishment for the violation of the norm of fairness (Crockett et al. 2010; Peysakhovich, Nowak, & Rand, 2014) . In terms of gender differences, Eckel and Grossman (2001) reported that women are more likely than men to accept low offers; by contrast, Solnick (2001) found the opposite, that women are less likely than men to accept low offers; in line with the latter work, García-Gallego, Georgantzís, and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez (2012) found that women are more likely to reject low offers; finally, Bueno-Guerra, Leiva, Colell, and Call (2016) found no gender differences in rejection rates among little girls and little boys between 6 and 10 years. To the best of our knowledge, only one work explored whether the two genders differ in the way they punish defectors in games involving cooperation. Burnham (2018) investigated gender differences in punishment in two versions of the public goods game. In the standard, baseline version, four players were asked whether they wanted to contribute (part of) a given endowment to a public pool. The total amount in the public pool was then multiplied by 1.6 and equally divided among all players. In this way, it is individually optimal not to contribute to the public pool, but if neither player contributes, then all participants are worse off than if they had all contributed. In the "rank based" variant, participants with high payoffs earned an extra bonus, while participants with low payoffs incurred a penalty. In doing so, Burnham observed no gender differences in punishment in the standard public goods game, but he observed that men punish more in the "rank based" variant. Although important in their domain, these studies do not allow us to answer our research questions. As mentioned above, none of the studies explored whether men and women are punished differently when they fail to cooperate. A secondary limitation is that none of these studies investigated whether women and men are discriminated in the way they are rewarded when they cooperate.
In this paper, we move a step towards filling this gap through two pre-registered studies and a pre-study. In the pre-study, participants play a public goods game knowing that they might be rewarded or punished by an observer. Then, in Study 1, brand new participants are asked to reward or punish the behaviour of the participants in the pre-study. Reward and punishment are experimentally implemented in the standard way, by asking participants whether they want to pay a cost to increase/decrease the payoff of the participant of the pre-study with whom they are matched. Crucially, participants in Study 1 are given information about the gender of the participant in the pre-study. In this way, we can test whether the amount of punishment/reward depends on the gender of the participant who made a decision in the public goods game. First, we find that, in line with previous studies, people use this mechanism meaningfully: defectors are punished far more than cooperators, and cooperators are rewarded far more than defectors. Regarding our main research question, we find no significant gender differences: participants reward and punish women and men to a very similar extent. This remains true also when we split the sample by genders: neither men nor women discriminate among genders, when it comes to reward/punish their behaviour in our public goods game. In Study 2 we propose an extension of Study 1 to a different form of punishment and reward. Inspired by the recent development of online rating systems, in Study 2 participants can rate the behaviour of the participants of the pre-study from 1 to 5 stars. In line with previous work, we find that participants use this rating meaningfully: cooperators receive, on average, a much greater rating than defectors (Capraro, Giardini, Vilone, & Paolucci, 2016) . Coming to our main research question, in line with Study 1, we find that women and men are rated on average the same. And, as in Study 1, the same holds when we split the sample by gender: neither men nor women discriminate among genders, when they rate the behaviour of men and women in our public goods game.
In sum, our results show that, at least in our studies, neither men nor women make gender discriminations when they are in charge of punishing or rewarding the behaviour of men and women in a public goods game.
Related literature
This paper is related to several streams of literature. As mentioned in the introduction, the closest line of research is that which explores gender differences in punishment in the ultimatum game (Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001; García-Gallego et al. 2012; Bueno-Guerra et al. 2016 ) and the public goods game (Burnham, 2018) . Our work differs from this in that it does not look at whether men and women punish differently, but it looks at whether men and women are punished differently. Moreover, it also looks at the whether the two genders are rewarded differently. Finally, it does so also using a novel form of rating, inspired by online ratings.
This work more generally relates to the huge literature on gender differences in decision making. Behavioural scientists have explored gender differences in several decisional domains, including competition (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2004; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Gneezy, Leonard, & List, 2009 ), risk aversion (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999) , cooperation (Balliet, Li, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011; Rand, 2017) , altruism (Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Engel, 2011; Rand et al. 2016; Brañas-Garza et al. 2018) , honesty (Capraro, 2018; Abeler, Nosenzo, & Raymond, 2019; Gerlach, Teodorescu, & Hertwig, 2019) , the equity-efficiency trade-off (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Dickinson and Tiefenthaler, 2002; Fehr, Naef and Schmidt, 2006; Stieglitz, Gurven, Kaplan, and Hopfensitz, 2017; Capraro, 2019) , and harm aversion (Fumagalli et al. 2010; Friesdorf, Conway, & Gawronski, 2015; Capraro & Sippel, 2017) . Our work differs from these papers, in that it explores gender differences in the way people discriminate the two genders when they are in charge of punishing defectors or rewarding cooperation; this type of gender difference was not previously explored.
Our work also relates to the longstanding debate regarding whether women and men are penalized or rewarded differently for the same behaviour in the workplace. For example, Rudman (1998) found that self-promotion among women leads them to receive higher competence ratings, but it has the cost that they are perceived to be less socially attractive and hireable. Heilman and Chen (2005) found that women are penalized when they fail to act altruistically in the workplace, and they are not rewarded when they act altruistically; by contrast, men are rewarded when they act altruistically, and they are not penalized when they fail to act altruistically. Heilman and Chen also showed that this effect was driven by different prescriptive stereotypes. Bowles, Babcock, Lai (2007) found that evaluators penalize women more than men for initiating negotiations. Moreover, women were less inclined to negotiate with male evaluators. No gender differences were found when the evaluator was female. Babcock, Recalde, Vesterlund and Weingart (2017) found that women are more likely than men to volunteer, asked to volunteer, and accept requests to volunteer for low promotability tasks. And this was partly driven by the beliefs that women are more likely than men to say yes to low promotability tasks. Several studies have shown that students rate female instructors less than their male counterparts (MacNell, 2015; Boring, 2017; Mengel, Sauermann, & Zölitz, 2019) . Our work differs from these because it focuses on cooperative behaviour in the stylized setting of a laboratory experiment using the public goods game.
Pre-study
In this preliminary study, we collect data regarding how participants play a public goods game (PGG) knowing that they might be rewarded or punished by a third party who will be communicated their contribution to the public good. This study serves two goals. On the one hand, it allows us to avoid deception in Study 1. On the other hand, it permits to compare the efficacy of punishment with the efficacy of reward in promoting cooperation in a one-shot public goods game. This is interesting in itself, because, it allows us to contribute to the literature comparing the effectiveness of these two mechanisms for promoting cooperation (Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011) .
Method
The experiment was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010) through a survey built on Qualtrics. Participants were randomly divided in three conditions. In the PGG-Baseline condition, they made a decision in a standard twoplayer, one-shot, public goods game (see below for the details); in the PGG-Punishment condition, they made a decision in the same public goods game as in the baseline condition, but knowing that an observer will be informed about their decision and will have the opportunity to punish them; in the PGG-Reward condition, they made a decision in the same public goods game as in the baseline condition, but knowing that an observer will be informed about their decision and will have the opportunity to reward them. Specifically, in the PGG-Baseline condition each participant was informed that he or she would be paired with another participant, who was reading the same set of instructions. The two participants were named Participant A and Participant B. Both participants were informed that they started with 20 points. They were also informed that there was a common pool, with 0 points at the beginning of the experiment. The participants were told that they could choose to contribute, or not, all of their points to the common pool. No intermediate contributions were allowed. The total amount in the common pool was then multiplied by 1.5 and equally distributed between the two participants. This payoff structure implies that it is individually optimal for both participants to not contribute to the public good; however, if both participants do not contribute, then they receive a payoff of 20 points, which is less than what they would have gotten if they had both contributed (30 points). In the PGG-Punishment condition, the participants were additionally informed of the existence of a third participant, named Participant C. They were informed that Participant C would be given 40 points and would be told the decision of both Participant A and Participant B. Participant C could then use their points to deduct points from either Participant A or Participant B, or both. For every deduction point used by Participant C, the number of points of the target participant would be reduced by three. Participants C's choices were collected separately (see Study 1). The PGG-Reward condition was identical to the PGG-Punishment condition, with the only difference that the participants were informed that Participant C could use their points to add points to their account. For every addition point used by Participant C, the number of points of the target participant would be increased by three. Participants were informed that 1 point would correspond to 1 US cent. After reading the instructions, participants were asked some comprehension questions. Participants failing the comprehension questions were automatically excluded from the survey. Participants passing the comprehension questions were allowed to make their public good decision, after which they entered a demographic questionnaire, at the end of which they received the completion code needed to claim their payment through AMT. After the experiment was ended and after conducting also Study 1, we computed the bonuses and we paid them on top of the participation fee (50 cents). No deception was used. The design, the exclusion criteria, and the analysis were pre-registered at: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=tc76r2.
Results
As pre-registered, in case of multiple IP addresses or multiple Turk IDs, we keep only the first observation, as determined by the starting date. In doing so, we remain with a total of N=526 participants (47% females; mean age = 36.4). Comparing the rate of cooperation in the baseline with the rate of cooperation in the two treatments, we clearly see that both mechanisms (punishment and reward) increased cooperation. See Figure 1 . Specifically, in the PGG-baseline condition, the rate of cooperation was 54.3% (in line with previous works using a similar payoff structure; Capraro, Jordan, & Rand, 2014) , whereas in the PGG-Punishment condition and in the PGG-Reward condition, the rates of cooperation were 72.9% and 71.5%, respectively; both significantly higher than the rate of cooperation in the PGG-baseline condition (logistic regression; PGG-Punishment vs PGG-Baseline: b = 0.819, z = 3.30, p = 0.001; PGG-Reward vs PGG-Baseline: b = 0.751, z = 3.35, p = 0.001). There was no statistical difference between the rate of cooperation in the PGG-Punishment condition and the rate of cooperation in the PGG-Reward condition (p = 0.814). This is in line with the meta-analysis by Balliet, Mulder, and Van Lange (2011) .
In sum, the pre-study shows that knowing that they might be punished or rewarded by a thirdparty, makes participants more cooperative in our one-shot two-player public goods game. Moreover, punishment and reward have virtually the same effect. 
Study 1
In the pre-study, we collected the decisions of participants playing a public goods game knowing that a third-party will be informed about their decision and will have the possibility to punish or reward them. In Study 1, we collect the punishing and rewarding decisions. Since our goal is to explore whether women and men are punished (rewarded) differently when they defect (cooperate) in the public goods game, in Study 1 we implement a 2 (punish, reward) x 2 (female, male) between-subjects design.
Methods
Participants were randomly divided in four conditions, the Punish-Anna condition, the Punish-Adam condition, the Reward-Anna condition, and the Reward-Adam condition. In the Punish-Anna (Punish-Adam) condition, participants were shown the instructions of the PGG exactly as in the PGG-Punishment condition in the pre-study, with the only difference that Participant A was named Anna (Adam). After reading the instructions of the PGG, participants were given 40 points and were told that they could use these points to deduct points from the account of Anna (Adam) and/or Participant B. For every deduction point used, the account of the participant would be decreased by 1 point, while the account of Anna (Adam) or Participant B would be decreased by 3 points. The Reward-Anna (Reward-Adam) condition is identical, except for the fact that participants can use their points to add points to Anna's (Adam's) or Participant B's account. For every addition point used, the account of the participant would be decreased by 1 point, while the account of Anna (Adam) or Participant B would be increased by 3 points. Participants were informed that 1 point would correspond to 1 US cent. After reading the instructions, participants were asked some comprehension questions to make sure they understood the game. Participants failing the comprehension questions were automatically excluded from the survey. Participants passing the comprehension questions were allowed to make their punishing (rewarding) decisions in eight different scenarios, one of which would be randomly selected to determine their payment. To make sure that participants passing the comprehension questions had also understood the gender of the participant they were asked to punish/reward, some of the questions contain the name Anna (Adam) and the gendered pronoun her (him). For example, one comprehension question was: "In Stage 1, what is the choice that Anna should make in order to maximize her number of points?" The eight scenarios corresponded to all four possible combinations of Anna's (Adam's) choice and the choice of Participant B times two, corresponding to whether the participant was asked to deduct/add Anna's (Adam's) points or Participant B's points. After making their decisions, participants entered a demographic questionnaire, at the end of which they received the completion code needed to claim their payment through AMT. After the experiment was ended, we computed the bonuses (by randomly picking, for each participant in Study 1, a participant in the pre-study) and we paid them on top of the participation fee (50 cents). In this way, all decisions were incentivised and no deception was used. The design, the exclusion criteria, and the analysis were preregistered at: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=tc76r2.
Results
As pre-registered, in case of multiple IP addresses or multiple Turk IDs, we keep only the first observation, as determined by the starting date. In doing so, we remain with a total of N=1,077 participants (52% females; mean age = 38.2). Figure 2 reports the number of points used by the participant to punish Anna (Adam) and Participant B 1 , split by the public good contributions made by Anna (Adam) and Participant B. In the x-axis of the figure, the first component of each pair corresponds to the contribution made by the participant to be punished. For example, the first blue column represents the average number of points used to punish Adam when he contributes 20 points to the public good while the other participant contributes 0 points. Similarly, the last grey column reports the average number of points used to punish Participant B when s/he contributes 0 points to the public good while the other participant contributes 20 points. We clearly note that the extent to which a defector is punished strongly depends on the choice of the other player. Specifically, the average number of points used to punish a defector when their partner cooperates is 2.16, which is significantly higher than the average number of points used to punish a defector when the other person defects, which is 0.38 points (linear regression: b = 1.781, t = 13.21, p <.001). In turn, the average number of points used to punish a defector when their partner defects is significantly greater than the average number of points used to punish a cooperator 2 , both when their partner cooperates (0.22 points used to punish, on average; comparison vs. punishing a defector when their partner defects: b = 0.160, t=2.32, p=0.020) and when their partner defects (0.18 points used to punish, on average; comparisons vs. punishing a defector when their partner defects: b = 0.196, t=3.31, p=0.001).
Punishment
Coming to gender differences, we use linear regression to compare the number of points used to reward Adam, Anna, and Participant B. In total, there are twelve comparisons (four comparisons Adam vs. Anna, four comparisons Adam vs. Participant B, and four comparisons Anna vs. Participant B). None of these comparisons turn out to be statistically significant (all p's > 0.263). Therefore, we find no evidence that Adam and Anna are punished differently.
Next, as pre-registered, we study whether females and males punish at a different rate. To this end, we conduct linear regression predicting the number of points used to punish Adam, Anna, and Participant B, in each of the four cases (20, 20) , (20,0), (0,20) and (0, 0), for males and females separately. This generates a total of twenty-four comparisons. None of these comparisons turn out to be statistically significant (all p's > 0.149). Therefore, we find no evidence that men and women punish Adam and Anna differently. Rewarding Figure 3 reports the number of points used by the participant to reward Anna (Adam) and Participant B, split by the contributions to the public good made by Anna (Adam) and Participant B. In the x-axis of the figure, the first component of each pair corresponds to the contribution made by the participant to be rewarded. For example, the first blue column represents the average number of points used to reward Adam when he contributes 20 points to the public good while the other participant contributes 0 points. We clearly note that cooperators are rewarded way more than defectors, especially when their partner defects. The average number of points used to reward a cooperator when their partner defects is 4.02, compared to the average number of points used to reward a cooperator when their partner cooperates, that is, 2.07 (b = 1.952, t = 7.09, p < 0.001). In turn, this is greater than the average number of points used to reward a defector, both when their partner defects (that is, the average is 0.57; b = 1.504, t = 6.95, p<0.001) and when their partner cooperates (the average is 0.66; b = 1.417, t = 6.25, p<0.001). No statistically significant difference is present between these two latter cases (p=0.604). We also observe that people use more points to reward (average = 1.854) than to punish (average = 0.741). The difference is statistically significant (b = 1.112, t = 12.30, p < .001).
Coming to gender differences, we use linear regression to compare the number of points used to reward Adam, Anna, and Participant B. As in the punishment case, there are twelve comparisons and none of them turn out to be statistically significant (all p's > 0.162). Therefore, we find no evidence that Adam and Anna are rewarded differently. Next, as pre-registered, we study whether females and males reward at a different rate. As in the punishment case, this generates a total of twenty-four comparisons, none of which turn out to be statistically significant (all p's > 0.169). Therefore, we find no evidence that men and women reward Adam and Anna differently.
Study 2
Study 1 provides evidence that women and men do not discriminate between genders when they have to punish a defector or reward a cooperator. Study 2 aims to extend this finding to a different mechanism to judge someone's behaviour. Specifically, in Study 2 participants are informed about the choice of Anna (Adam) and are asked to rate this choice from 1 star to 5 stars. We believe this to be an interesting case because many online reputation systems are based on a similar rating system. This rating system was first studies in the context of social dilemmas played online by Capraro, Giardini, Vilone, and Paolucci (2016) . In their paper, the authors showed that participants tend to rate cooperators higher than defectors and tend to prefer people with higher reputation as partners, even when they know nothing about how the reputation was acquired. However, they have no data regarding how people rate cooperators and defectors conditional on their gender.
Method
Participants were randomly divided in two conditions, the Rate-Adam condition and the Rate-Anna condition. In the Rate-Adam (Rate-Anna) condition, participants were informed that Adam (Anna) and Participant B were playing a game. The game and the instructions were identical to the ones in the previous studies. After the instructions of the game, participants were asked some comprehension questions. Participants failing any comprehension question were automatically excluded from the survey. After the comprehension questions, participants were asked, in random order, to answer the following questions: (i) "Assume that Adam decided to contribute. How would you rate his behaviour? (Available answers: 1 star/2 stars/3 stars/4 stars/5 stars); and (ii) "Assume that Adam decided to not contribute. How would you rate his behaviour? (Available answers: 1 star/2 stars/3 stars/4 stars/5 stars). After rating Adam (Anna), participants entered the demographic questionnaire, after which they were given the completion code needed to claim for their payment on Mechanical Turk. After the survey was over, participants were paid their participation fee (30 cents). The method and the analysis were pre-registered at: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=kr98xr.
Results
In case of multiple IP addresses or multiple Turk IDs, we keep only the first observation, as determined by the starting date. In doing so, we remain with a total of N=253 participants (45% females; mean age = 37.24).
The average rating received by Adam when he cooperates is virtually identical to the average rating received by Anna, when she cooperates (4.22 vs. 4.21; linear regression: b = 0.010, t = 0.08, p = 0.935). Similarly, the average rating received by Adam when he defects is virtually identical to the average rating received by Anna, when she defects (2.92 vs. 2.88; linear regression: b = 0.035, t = 0.24, p = 0.814). Also, splitting the sample by gender, we find that the average rating given to Adam by men when Adam cooperates is 4.19, which is very similar to the average rating given by women, which is 4.24 (b = 0.059, t = 0.45, p = 0.724). Similarly, the average rating given to Adam by men, when Adam defects is 2.96, is very similar to the average rating given by women, which is 2.86 (b = -0.111, t = -0.51, p = 0.609). Finally, also the average rating given to Anna by men when Anna cooperates is not statistically different from the average rating given to Anna by women (4.24 vs. 4.17; b = -0.070, t = -0.43, p = 0.669); the same happens with the average rating given to Anna when she defects (2.73 by men vs. 3.07 by women; b = 0.334, t = 1.60, p = 0.112). 
Discussion
Across two experiments, we showed that people do not discriminate between men and women when they are in charge of punishing a defector or rewarding a cooperator, at least in our idealised setting of a laboratory experiment where cooperative behaviour is measured through a one-shot public goods game. This held not only when punishment and reward were implemented using standard laboratory techniques (decrease/increase the payoff of the defector/cooperator; Study 1), but also when they were implemented using a technique inspired by the recent development of online rating systems (rating the behaviour of a defector/cooperator from 1 to 5 stars; Study 2). The results also held across genders: neither men nor women discriminated between genders when punishing/rewarding defectors/cooperators. This work goes beyond previous literature along several dimensions. As mentioned in the Literature Review section, previous research had mainly focused on whether men and women punish or reward differently (Solnick, 2001; García-Gallego et al. 2012; Bueno-Guerra et al. 2016; Burnham, 2018) . While this is an important and interesting case, it did not cover the mirror question of whether men and women are punished/rewarded differently. This latter question is also interesting, in particular because of the current discussion on gender parity. We do not hide, in fact, that this is what motivated us to start this research project. To date, many experiments have shown that women are penalized more than men when they display certain behaviours in the workplace; these behaviours include self-promotion (Rudman, 1998) , unhelping (Heilman and Chen, 2005) , and initiation of negotiations (Babcock, Recalde, Vesterlund and Weingart, 2017) ; female instructors also receive lower ratings than their male counterparts (MacNell, 2015; Boring, 2017; Mengel, Sauermann, & Zölitz, 2019) . Although these are all very important situations, they do not cover a case that we believe to be very important, not only in the workplace, but in every human society: cooperation. Are women punished more than men when they fail to cooperate? Are men rewarded more than women when they cooperate? In this paper, we moved a step towards addressing these questions. Of course, these questions can be asked in general, without any reference to the specific setting of the workplace. For the sake of generality, therefore, we placed ourselves in the idealised setting of a laboratory experiment; we did so to avoid any particular frame that might cause a loss of generality. In this general aseptic setting, our results speak quite clearly: people do not discriminate between genders when they are in charge of punishing (rewarding) defectors (cooperators).
But, of course, generality comes with a cost. And the cost is precisely the fact that perhaps we found no gender discrimination exactly because we placed the participants in the idealized setting of a laboratory experiment. Had the participants been placed in a prototypically feminine cooperative setting, perhaps we would have observed women being punished more than men; symmetrically, had the participants been placed in a prototypically masculine cooperative context, perhaps, this time, we would have observed men being punished more than women. This suggests a direction for future research that we believe to be of primary interest, that is, manipulating the frame of the public goods game in order to make it more perceivably feminine vs. masculine, and study whether there is an asymmetry in the way the two genders are punished in "their own" prototypical public goods game. This, in turn, opens the sub-question of how one can frame the games in such a way to make them more gender salient. In one of her many illuminating articles, Alice Eagly (2009) suggests that prosociality among women is primarily directed towards other people, while prosociality among men is primarily directed towards groups and organisations. Therefore, perhaps one can develop public goods games with special frames that manipulate the saliency of who receives the benefit of the cooperative action, other people vs. the group. This is certainly worth exploring in future work.
Another potential limitation of our work regards the way we manipulated the gender of the participant to be punished/rewarded, that is, by having punishers/rewarders reading the instructions of the public goods game where the decision makers were called Adam (Anna) and Participant B. This methodology can be criticised along (at least) two dimensions. First, it is possible that some participants did not know that Anna is a feminine name while Adam is a masculine name. Second, it is possible that some participants did not pay enough attention, and perhaps did not even read the names of the decision makers. Although we acknowledge these limitations, we do believe they are minor. In fact, we carefully wrote the instructions of the experiments with the goal of referring to the gender of the decision maker, either through the direct name, or through the pronouns, in several occasions; including in the comprehension questions. For example, one of the comprehension questions of Study 1 was "In Stage 1, what is the choice that Anna should make in order to maximize her number of points?" This question contains both the name "Anna" and the pronoun "her". Taking into account that only participants who passed all the comprehension questions were allowed to complete the experiment, it is hard to believe that these participants did not understand the gender of the person to be punished/rewarded. In sum, our results showed that people do not discriminate between genders when they are in charge of punishing (rewarding) defectors (cooperators) in a one-shot public goods game. Future work should explore what happens in gender-framed cooperation games.
